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Although universal health coverage (UHC) is a global health policy priority, there remains limited evidence on UHC
reforms in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs). This paper provides an overview of key insights from case
studies in this thematic series, undertaken in seven LMICs (Costa Rica, Georgia, India, Malawi, Nigeria, Tanzania, and
Thailand) at very different stages in the transition to UHC.
These studies highlight the importance of increasing pre-payment funding through tax funding and sometimes
mandatory insurance contributions when trying to improve financial protection by reducing out-of-pocket
payments. Increased tax funding is particularly important if efforts are being made to extend financial protection to
those outside formal-sector employment, raising questions about the value of pursuing contributory insurance
schemes for this group. The prioritisation of insurance scheme coverage for civil servants in the first instance in
some LMICs also raises questions about the most appropriate use of limited government funds.
The diverse reforms in these countries provide some insights into experiences with policies targeted at the
poor compared with universalist reform approaches. Countries that have made the greatest progress to UHC,
such as Costa Rica and Thailand, made an explicit commitment to ensuring financial protection and access to
needed care for the entire population as soon as possible, while this was not necessarily the case in countries
adopting targeted reforms. There also tends to be less fragmentation in funding pools in countries adopting a
universalist rather than targeting approach. Apart from limiting cross-subsidies, fragmentation of pools has
contributed to differential benefit packages, leading to inequities in access to needed care and financial
protection across population groups; once such differentials are entrenched, they are difficult to overcome.
Capacity constraints, particularly in purchasing organisations, are a pervasive problem in LMICs. The case studies
also highlighted the critical role of high-level political leadership in pursuing UHC policies and citizen support in
sustaining these policies.
This series demonstrates the value of promoting greater sharing of experiences on UHC reforms across LMICs. It
also identifies key areas of future research on health care financing in LMICs that would support progress
towards UHC.
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There is growing policy momentum for countries to move
towards universal health coverage (UHC), with resolutions
calling for UHC being adopted in the World Health As-
sembly as well as the United Nations General Assembly
during 2012. UHC was defined in the 2010 World Health
Report as ensuring that everyone within a country can ac-
cess the health services they need, which should be of suffi-
cient quality to be effective, and providing all with financial
protection from the costs of using health services [1].
With a few notable exceptions (such as the USA),
UHC reforms are particularly focused on low- and middle-
income countries (LMICs). As governments consider ways
in which UHC goals can be achieved within their context,
it is critical that there is greater documentation and sharing
of experiences across LMICs in particular. It was with this
in mind that the Alliance for Health Policy and Systems
Research (World Health Organization) called for proposals
to assess efforts towards universal financial risk protection
in LMICs in 2009. Seven countries were selected for inclu-
sion in this project and the results of the country case
studies are reported in this series of articles.
This paper provides an overview of the key issues and
lessons from these seven countries, supplemented by re-
cent literature on UHC in LMICs. As the case studies were
very diverse in terms of the issues of focus and methodo-
logical approaches, their findings were reviewed using two
conceptual frameworks as a means of achieving some co-
herence. Firstly, information was extracted in relation to
the key functions of health financing systems, namely rev-
enue collection, pooling and purchasing, including the or-
ganisational arrangements for undertaking these functions
[2]. The second framework is the policy analysis triangle,
which considers the process, actors and context within
which policy is developed and implemented [3]. The next
section provides a brief overview of the specific reforms
that were examined in each country case study, followed
by a presentation of the key issues arising from the analysis
of health financing functions and policy.
Overview of case study countries
Table 1 provides an overview of the reforms aimed at
expanding health coverage in the seven countries included
in this project. Table 2 presents economic, health status,
and health systems indicators for these countries, providing
insight into the very different contexts of each country.
Thailand and Costa Rica are both upper-middle-income
countries that are regarded as having made remarkable
progress towards UHC. They have the lowest infant and
maternal mortality rates and greatest health service cover-
age levels (proxied by the percentage of deliveries made by
a skilled attendant in Table 2), even though they do not
have the highest doctor to population ratios. Costa Rica
has particularly high levels of health care expenditure, withgovernment funding being the major component in both
countries, particularly in Thailand. Thailand is quite excep-
tional in having achieved UHC at relatively low cost, with
government expenditure on health care being only 3.1% of
GDP. These two countries are widely regarded as key ex-
amples that progress towards UHC is feasible not only for
high-income countries; both countries embarked on ambi-
tious programs of expanding coverage when still consid-
ered to be lower-middle or low-income countries. While
they were able to make particularly strong progress at
times of high economic growth, both countries protected
and maintained government health spending levels during
periods of economic downturn.
In Georgia and India, the countries with the second
highest levels of economic development, recent initiatives
have been introduced with the aim of extending health
insurance coverage to the poorest population. In both
countries, government revenue was used to pay insurance
contributions for this group. In Georgia, private insurance
schemes were used to provide cover [4], while in India
both public and private insurance schemes were used [5].
While coverage of key health services, such as attended de-
liveries, is relatively high in Georgia, it remains low in India
and health status indicators are far better in Georgia than
in India. India has one of the lowest levels of government
spending on health in the world.
The Tanzania and Nigeria case studies considered efforts
to expand health insurance coverage. Both countries initi-
ated mandatory health insurance by first covering civil ser-
vants, although in Nigeria, this was initially only for federal
government employees [6]. The key focus in Nigeria has
been to attempt to extend the National Health Insurance
Scheme (NHIS) to government employees at state level.
In Tanzania, the recent focus has been on extending
coverage to those outside the formal-employment sector
on a voluntary basis via the district level Community
Health Funds (CHF), but with the National Health Insur-
ance Fund (NHIF) taking over management of the CHF
[7]. Both countries have high poverty rates, poor health
status indicators and low levels of health service cover-
age. Nigeria has very low levels of government health ex-
penditure, some of which is donor funded. Although
Tanzania appears to have relatively high levels of govern-
ment funding of health services, the majority of this is
donor funded (donor funding accounts for 60% of all
health care expenditure) [8].
Malawi has the lowest per capita income of all of the
case study countries, a high poverty rate and poor health
status indicators (although better than Tanzania and
Nigeria). Again, the government expenditure on health
reflected in Table 2 is deceptive, both because GDP is
very low and nearly 90% of all health care expenditure in
Malawi is funded by donors. Malawi is attempting to im-
prove access to needed health services and provide some
Table 1 Summary of reforms of focus and methodological approach in country case studies
Country Reforms of focus Methodological approach
Costa Rica • Phased extension since 1940 of mandatory insurance coverage,
through the social security fund (Caja Costarricense de Seguro
Social: CCSS), to the entire population, beginning with formal-
sector employees in urban areas, then to rural employees, and
then to the self-employed and the poor (with government
paying the contribution for the poor from tax funds)
• Qualitative study using document reviews, key-informant
interviews and focus group discussions (FGDs)
• Historical lens applied
• Used actor mapping framework
• Used policy analysis triangle framework
• Bringing hospitals under the control of the mandatory insurance
scheme and improving primary health care services
Georgia • Providing insurance coverage for the poor, using government
funds to pay private health insurance scheme contributions
(Medical Insurance for the Poor (MIP) program)
• Mixed methods: analysis of secondary national household
survey data and primary qualitative data collection and
analysis (key-informant interviews and FGDs)
India • Providing insurance coverage for the poor, using government
funds to pay contributions to health insurance schemes (public
or private) (Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojana: RSBY initiative)
• Mixed methods: household survey of beneficiary households;
and key-informant interviews and FGDs
Malawi • Contracting (establishing Service Level Agreements - SLAs) with
faith-based providers to provide health services free of charge to
vulnerable populations, particularly for maternal and neonatal
services
• Case study design (facility-based SLA as the unit of analysis)
• Mixed methods: exit survey and key-informant interviews
Nigeria • Efforts to extend coverage of the National Health Insurance
Scheme from the initial target membership of Federal civil
servants to State civil servants
• Case study design (state as the unit of analysis)
• Qualitative study using document review and key-informant
interviews
Tanzania • Transfer of management of district level community-based
voluntary health insurance schemes (Community Health Fund:
CHF) to the National Health Insurance Fund (NHIF), a mandatory
scheme initially established for civil servants but now open to
other formal-sector workers
• Case study design (district as the unit of analysis)
• Mixed methods: key-informant interviews and focus group
discussions; review of facility financial and utilisation records
Thailand • Phased extension of mandatory insurance coverage to entire
population
• Case study design (policy design feature as the unit of analysis)
• Qualitative study using key-informant interviews and document
reviews
• Used policy analysis triangle framework
• Used policy network approach
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facilities, which are often based in rural areas, to provide
health services without charging a user fee to vulnerable
populations, with a particular focus on maternal and
neo-natal services [9].Table 2 Key economic, health status, and health systems indi
Costa
Population (in thousands) (2009) 4,57
GNI per capita (PPP Int. $) (2009) 10,9
Poverty rate (% population living on <PPP Int. $1 per day) 2%
Infant mortality per 1,000 live births (2009) 10
Maternal mortality per 100,000 live births (2008) 44
Deliveries by skilled attendant 99%
Doctor per 10,000 population 13
Total health expenditure as % GDP (2008) 9.4
General government health expenditure as % GDP (2008) 6.3
Out-of-pocket payments as % total health expenditure (2008) 29%
External resources for health as % of total expenditure on health (2008) 0.1This overview indicates that the countries included in
this project are at very different stages of economic devel-
opment. Only two countries can be considered to have
come close to achieving UHC (Costa Rica and Thailand),
yet all other countries are exploring ways of improvingcators for case study countries [8]
Rica Georgia India Malawi Nigeria Tanzania Thailand
9 4,260 1,198,003 15,263 154,729 43,739 67,764
30 4,700 3,250 760 2,070 1,350 7,640
13.4% 41.6% 73.9% 64.4% 88.5% <2%
26 50 69 86 68 12
48 230 510 840 790 48
98% 47% 54% 39% 51% 99%
.2 45.4 6.0 0.2 4.0 0.1 3.0
% 8.7% 4.2% 9.1% 5.2% 4.5% 4.1%
% 2.7% 1.4% 5.5% 1.9% 3.3% 3.1%
67% 50% 12% 60% 18% 18%
% 10.5% 1.6% 88.9% 4.6% 59.5% 0.3%
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extend membership in health insurance schemes. In the
rest of this paper, we consider key issues emerging from
the diverse experiences of the seven different countries in
relation to health care financing functions and policy
process, actors and context.
Health care financing functions
Table 3 describes the health care financing policies ex-
amined in the country case studies in terms of the three
health care financing functions, i.e., revenue collection,
pooling and purchasing.
Revenue collection and pooling issues
All of the reforms in the country case studies in some way
attempted to address the UHC goal of improving financial
protection through reducing out-of-pocket payments. This
was accompanied by explicit efforts to increase pre-
payment for health services, mainly through introducing or
expanding health insurance coverage. However, Malawi
attempted to protect vulnerable people from out-of-pocket
payments at mission facilities, but without necessarily mak-
ing efforts to increase pre-payment funds (such as generat-
ing more tax revenue or donor funds) to cover the cost of
‘free’ services. As a result, there are insufficient funds to
pay for the contracted services, resulting in late or non-
payment of bills submitted by the mission facilities, which
then stopped providing ‘free’ services [9].
Four of the countries – Costa Rica [10], Thailand,
Tanzania and Nigeria – followed the example of some
high-income countries and initiated efforts to improve fi-
nancial protection by introducing mandatory health insur-
ance schemes for certain groups of formal-sector workers,
with some countries intending to ultimately cover the en-
tire population with insurance schemes. In Costa Rica,
mandatory insurance was initially restricted to workers in
urban areas, whereas in the other three countries, the focus
was on civil servants; however, in Nigeria, the focus was
even narrower and initially only included federal govern-
ment employees (Table 3). While Costa Rica took several
decades to expand coverage to include most of the popula-
tion, Thailand achieved universal financial protection of
the population within 24 years [11]. There has been very
slow progress in extending insurance scheme coverage in
the other two countries, with only 4% of the population
covered in Nigeria and 12% in Tanzania.
There are interesting differences in the approaches
adopted in three of the countries to extending financial
protection via insurance schemes to those outside formal-
sector employment (i.e., those involved in ‘informal sector’
and subsistence agriculture activities, the unemployed and
the poor). While Costa Rica paid for CCSS (the mandatory
insurance scheme) membership for these groups using
general tax funds from when scheme membership wasextended to them, Thailand and Tanzania attempted to
extend insurance scheme membership to these groups
on a voluntary, contributory basis (through the Voluntary
Health Card Scheme introduced in 1983 in Thailand and
the district level Community Health Fund (CHF) in
Tanzania). Thailand ultimately decided to abandon this
approach and tax funds were used to pay contributions
for all those outside the formal-employment sector when
the Universal Coverage Scheme (UCS) was introduced in
2002. Part of the reason for this change in policy was the
recognition that attempting to extend coverage to those
outside formal employment on a voluntary, contributory
basis results in a substantial portion of the population
remaining ‘uncovered’ (30% in 2001 in Thailand) [11].
Tanzania has continued with the CHF as a voluntary
contributory scheme, but has attempted to strengthen
its management by contracting CHF management out
to the NHIF, which has contributed to a doubling of CHF
membership, but from a very low base of only 2% of the
population [7].
There is widespread recognition that extending health
insurance scheme coverage to the entire population re-
quires substantial funding from general tax revenue to
fully or partially subsidise contributions for those unable
to pay themselves [1]. In this regard, it is noteworthy
that in the two countries that are furthest along the path
to UHC (Costa Rica and Thailand), government funding
(which includes tax funding and mandatory insurance
contributions) is the largest share of total health care ex-
penditure. The Thai case study demonstrated how introdu-
cing the UCS was a mechanism for leveraging considerable
increases in tax funding to ensure that the population out-
side of the formal sector were able to access a wide range
of services of good quality.
A key question that requires further research is, given
the magnitude of tax funds required to universalise health
insurance coverage, is it worthwhile pursuing contributory
schemes for those outside the formal sector in LMICs? In
particular, the administrative efficiency of this approach
(i.e., comparing the revenue generated to the costs of
collecting revenue from this group) should be evaluated.
Existing research indicates that it is a very regressive way
of generating revenue for health care [12] and that gross
revenue generation is quite low (for example, NHI contri-
butions by those outside the formal-employment sector in
Ghana account for only 5% of NHIF revenue) [13].
The seven country case studies raise important questions
about the use of general tax revenue and other government
funds (such as resources generated through royalties from
the exploitation of oil reserves as in Nigeria). In particular,
is it appropriate to prioritise the use of limited government
resources to pay for health insurance coverage for civil ser-
vants, given that they are already a relatively privileged
group? The issue of appropriate use of government funds
Table 3 Overview of health financing systems in case study countries
Country Revenue collection and pooling Purchasing
Costa Rica • Tax funds pooled with mandatory insurance contributions
in the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social (CCSS), which was
established in 1941
• CCSS purchases primary and hospital care for the entire
population, irrespective of whether they make contributions
to CCSS or not
• CCSS population coverage reached 88% in early 2000’s
Georgia • General government revenue finances the Medical Insurance
for the Poor (MIP) program
• Private Insurance Companies (PICs), contracted by the
government, purchase health services for MIP members
• A proxy means-tested system is used to identify MIP
beneficiaries (i.e., poor households)
• The MIP benefit package includes: (1) emergency care and
planned in-patient services; (2) chemotherapy and radiation
therapy; (3) outpatient visits and limited diagnostic and laboratory
tests; (4) compensation for delivery costs; and (5) outpatient
prescription drugs
• Of the Georgian population, 20.5% are covered by MIP, 3.6%
by civil servant insurance, 6.5% by other insurance (mainly
private, voluntary), and 69.4% are not covered by insurance
India • Under the Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojana (RSBY), households
on the national ‘Below Poverty Line’ list can join the insurance
scheme for a premium that is heavily subsidised by the
government (individuals pay $0.6 per family per year)
• Insurance companies purchase inpatient care for RSBY members
from hospitals. State nodal agencies oversee insurance companies
• The RSBY package covers inpatient care up to $600 per family
per year
• RSBY covers 30 million people (about 55% of those below
the poverty line)
• Hospitals are paid on a diagnosis-related group (DRG) basis
Malawi • The health system in Malawi is mainly financed by government
tax revenue and high levels of donor funding
• Purchasing mainly undertaken through Ministry of Health (MoH)-
established SLAs with the CHAM facilities at the district level
• Government tax funding subsidises Christian Health
Association of Malawi (CHAM) facilities as specified in Service
Level Agreement (SLA) contracts
• MoH pays CHAM clinical staff salaries and provides medicines
and other supplies
• SLAs aim to deliver free health care to the most vulnerable
and under-served population through CHAM facilities
Nigeria • 4% of the population, mainly federal government employees
and their families, are covered by mandatory insurance through
the National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) introduced in
2005. Although expansion of the scheme to state government
employees was intended, only 3 states have done so
• Purchasing mainly through NHIS allocation of funds to Health
Maintenance Organisations (HMOs) for the purchase of services
from public and private providers for those covered by the NHIS
• NHIS is financed by contributions from employees (5% of
basic salary) and employers (10% of employees’ basic salary)
• Payment made by capitation for primary care services and
fee-for-service for other levels of care (referral care must be
pre-approved by HMOs)
• The NHI benefit package includes: out-patient care, prescriptions
and diagnostic tests, maternity care, preventive medical and
dental care, specialist consultation, in-patient care, eye
examination and care, access to prostheses
Tanzania • The National Health Insurance Fund (NHIF) was established
in 1999 to cover civil servants and their dependents (about
5% of the population)
• CHF purchase health services on behalf of members
• The Social Health Insurance Benefit (SHIB) of the National
Social Security Fund (NSSF), established in 2005, covers mainly
private sector employees (about 1% of the population)
• Benefit packages vary between CHFs, but usually only cover
primary care outpatient services
• The Community Health Fund (CHF), rolled out nationally in
2001, focuses on those outside the formal sector in rural
areas and a similar scheme called TIKA for the informal
sector in urban areas (covers about 5% of the population)
• The NHIF and SHIB-NSSF purchase relatively comprehensive
services from accredited public and private providers
• The remainder of the population pay user fees when using
a health service
• CHF is funded by member contributions. Matching funds,
provided by Ministry of Health and Social Welfare, provides
subsidies. Co-payment for the utilization of health services
is required
Thailand • Three mandatory insurance schemes operate: the Civil
Servant Medical Benefit Scheme (CSMBS) established in 1978;
Social Security Scheme (SSS) for public and private sector
employees; and the Universal Coverage Scheme (UCS), which
covers the rest of the population (approximately 30%),
established in 2002
• UCS purchases services from registered contractor providers,
most commonly the district health system
• The benefit package is relatively comprehensive
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Table 3 Overview of health financing systems in case study countries (Continued)
• The UCS is funded by general Government tax revenue • Providers are paid by capitation for outpatients; and global
budget and DRG for inpatients
• The UCS initially had a 30 Baht co-payment, but this was
removed in 2007
• The CSMBS and SSS similarly purchase comprehensive services
for their members
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Nigeria, where there is no political nor Constitutional com-
mitment to universalism from the outset (in contrast to
Costa Rica and Thailand). The Nigerian case study found
that civil servants are unwilling to make any contributions
to mandatory schemes themselves, and have an expect-
ation that government should fully fund their participation
in the NHIS [6]. Although the government in Tanzania of-
fers to match contributions made to the CHF by those
outside the formal-employment sector, this approach di-
rects limited government funds to districts that have lower
poverty levels (i.e., where more people outside the formal-
employment sector have the ability-to-pay CHF contribu-
tions). The recent reforms of shifting management of CHF
to the NHIF have exacerbated this situation in that
claiming matching funds is now more complex and re-
quires considerable management capacity, which tends to
be worse in poorer districts [7].
Is it more appropriate to use government funds to tar-
get coverage for the poorest, as in India and Georgia (and
Malawi, albeit not through insurance scheme coverage
but through direct payments to faith-based facilities)?
And more generally, is a targeting (as in India, Georgia
and to some extent Malawi) or a universalist approach
(particularly as in Thailand and Costa Rica) more effect-
ive? The Thai experience with the Voluntary Health Card
Scheme highlights the problems of leakage and under-
coverage when trying to identify and target subsidies to
the poor and such problems contributed to the decision
to move to the tax-funded UCS for all those outside the
formal-employment sector. Empirical evidence suggests
that for health care financing, the identification of the
poorest or those most in need has proven to be a major
challenge [14], and that the approach entails high admin-
istrative costs and significant administrative sophistica-
tion and capacity [15].
A related issue is the extent to which general tax funds
are pooled with mandatory insurance contributions where
such schemes are used to move towards UHC. Only one of
the case study countries taking this route has a single pool
of tax revenue and mandatory insurance contributions,
namely Costa Rica’s CCSS. However, a key challenge within
Costa Rica is that the level of general tax funding is
inadequate and there is a growing government debt
to the CCSS [10]. While in Thailand tax funds are allo-
cated to the UCS to purchase services for those outside
formal-sector employment, there are two other mandatoryinsurance scheme pools and no mechanisms for promoting
cross-subsidies across the three pools.
Some countries were found to have considerable frag-
mentation of funding pools. For example, Tanzania has
two mandatory schemes for formal-sector workers (one
for civil servants and another for workers in private
companies). More importantly, the CHF consists of a
scheme in each district, and as the country moves to
having individual facility bank accounts, fund pools are
being fragmented even more with each facility maintaining
its own pool of CHF contributions. In Nigeria, although
there is a single NHIS, funds are fragmented between a
number of health maintenance organisations. Similarly,
funds in Georgia and India are fragmented across a num-
ber of insurance schemes that provide coverage for the
poor.
The international literature clearly highlights that frag-
mentation of fund pools should be minimised and the
bigger the pool, the better [1,16]. There are several rea-
sons for this, including that a single pool maximises in-
come and risk cross-subsidies (i.e., from the rich to the
poor and from the healthy to the ill). Thus, the extent of
fragmentation of pools strongly influences the extent to
which health care resources can be used to provide finan-
cial protection and access to needed care for everyone and
to minimise disparities across socio-economic groups.
Purchasing
The case studies highlight considerable differences across
countries in key elements of purchasing, including service
benefits covered, the provider payment mechanisms used,
the nature of the purchasing organisation (e.g., public or
private, and single or multi-purchaser arrangement) and
whether or not there is active or strategic purchasing of
services (Table 3). The reforms in Georgia, India and
Malawi were primarily around purchasing, as opposed to
the revenue collection or pooling functions. However, the
contracting of a number of different insurance schemes to
purchase services for the poor in India and Georgia did re-
sult in fragmentation of pools.
Service benefit issues
A key issue around service benefits relates to the issue of
fragmentation of funding pools, where benefit package
differences across schemes often become an issue. For
example, there are differences across the three schemes
in Thailand and a key priority at present is trying to
McIntyre et al. Health Research Policy and Systems 2013, 11:36 Page 7 of 10
http://www.health-policy-systems.com/content/11/1/36harmonise the benefit packages. However, even if the list
of services covered by each scheme is identical, the lack
of cross-subsidies across the three separate pools will
continue to result in differences in resources available
per person covered by the different schemes, and hence
differences in the type, range and quality of services used
across the schemes. This is illustrated by the large differ-
ences in per capita spending levels across the three
schemes in 2011, of Thai Baht 2,278 in the UCS, 2,280 in
the SSS but 14,239 in the CSMBS [17].
Shifting the management of the CHF to the NHIF in
Tanzania highlighted the differences in service benefits be-
tween these schemes, and created expectations that CHF
benefits would be increased to match those of the NHIF.
However, this is not feasible given the low contribution
rates and revenue for the CHF, and equally low matching
grants from government funds, and again highlights the
problem of limiting cross-subsidies by fragmenting pools.
The Tanzanian experience highlights the difficulty of inte-
grating pools once separate pools have been established;
there is opposition from civil servants to NHIF resources
(much of which comes from general tax funding) being
used to benefit CHF members [7]. This mirrors the ex-
perience in many Latin American countries where formal-
sector workers benefiting from mandatory insurance
schemes were reluctant for their benefits to potentially be
diluted through extending cover to those outside the for-
mal sector [18].
The country studies also highlight the different impli-
cations of comprehensive versus limited service benefits.
There are relatively low levels of out-of-pocket payments
in both countries with comprehensive service benefits,
Costa Rica and Thailand, and Thailand has evidence of
considerable reductions in catastrophic spending when
entitlement to comprehensive services with no user fees
or co-payments was extended to the whole population
[11]. In contrast, out-of-pocket payments remain high in
most of the countries that offer limited service benefits
(e.g., India only covering inpatient services; Georgia only
partially covering outpatient drugs which is the major
cause of catastrophic payments particularly for patients
with chronic diseases). More importantly in India and
Georgia, only the very poor are provided with financial
protection, and even those who are members of these
schemes do not always derive the benefits to which they
are entitled.
While it may be ideal to provide comprehensive bene-
fits, it is simply not feasible in lower-income countries at
this time. Costa Rica and Thailand have the highest
levels of economic development and so are better placed
to cover comprehensive service benefits. Both countries
now face challenges of sustaining accessible, quality ser-
vices in the context of having created an entitlement for
the entire population to comprehensive services.Creating an entitlement to service benefits (whether
comprehensive or limited) does not guarantee access to
these services. The Indian experience clearly illustrates
that those living further from health facilities were less
able to use needed services, or where they did, had to
incur higher levels of out-of-pocket payments [5]. An in-
teresting aspect of the Georgian experience was that the
private insurance schemes participating in the Medical
Insurance for the Poor initiative were required to up-
grade existing or construct new hospitals to improve
physical access to services [4]. However, this was effect-
ively paid for by the government as only 53% of the tax-
funded contributions to these schemes were devoted to
paying for services used by the poor and the rest used
for infrastructure development and scheme administration.
An important lesson from the Thai and Costa Rican ex-
perience is the strong and well-distributed service delivery
base, particularly at the primary health care level, which
has facilitated translating entitlements into improved levels
of service use and health status.
Provider payment mechanisms
Several countries introduced capitation and diagnosis-
related group (DRG) payment mechanisms instead of
fee-for-service, with varying degrees of success. In Nigeria,
there was considerable discontent with capitation pay-
ments among primary care providers [6]. This was also
the case with DRGs for inpatient care in India, where
there is evidence that some doctors refuse to see Rashtriya
Swasthya Bima Yojana (RSBY) – the insurance scheme for
the poor – patients as they regard the DRGs as being too
low [5]. In contrast, Thailand has been able to secure the
buy-in of providers to being paid on a capitation and DRG
basis for outpatient and inpatient care, respectively. In-
deed, the fact that these payment mechanisms would be
used along with a budget cap was critical in ensuring polit-
ical support for the UCS.
There are two key factors that may contribute to these
different experiences. Firstly, (private) providers’ accept-
ance of payment in forms other than fee-for-service is
likely to be influenced by the volume of services affected
by the payment scheme. In Thailand, where services for
the vast majority of the population are paid for via capi-
tation and DRGs, providers have little choice but to
accept this payment mechanism. In Nigeria and India,
however, the majority of patients are outside of the
schemes using such payment mechanisms and it is more
feasible to refuse to treat patients on this basis or at least
to complain vociferously and lobby for a change. This is a
key benefit of having considerable purchasing power con-
centrated in a single purchaser, or a few large ones. Sec-
ond, it is important that the capitation and DRG rates are
fair and regularly updated. In Nigeria, the capitation rate
has not been increased in six years [6], whereas in Thailand
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payment rates has also created problems in Malawi, where
the fee schedule has not been updated for five years [9].
There is a lack of clarity on what fees can be charged and
some of the contracted hospitals charge whatever they feel
appropriate, which has driven up costs considerably.
Issues related to the purchasing organisation
A critical issue is the capacity of the purchasing organisa-
tion and whether or not it engages in active or strategic
purchasing. The Malawian case study illustrates the diffi-
culties that can arise where there is poor capacity, in this
case within the Ministry of Health and its district offices,
which is purchasing services from faith-based facilities.
The inability of the districts to make timely payments or
supply drugs from the Ministry’s Central Medical Stores
has undermined the willingness and ability of mission facil-
ities to provide the contracted services [9]. The capacity
constraints are also evident in the limited supervision and
monitoring of services provided by contracted facilities. In
Tanzania, an explicit motivation for contracting the NHIF
to manage the CHF was the greater management capacity
within the NHIF. The case study highlights that supervi-
sion and monitoring of service quality, which is an im-
portant component of active or strategic purchasing, has
improved under NHIF management.
India and Georgia made the decision to draw on the
capacity within existing health insurance schemes by
contracting the schemes to serve as purchasers. Unfortu-
nately, the case studies provide no evidence of whether
these schemes engaged in strategic purchasing or were
more passive and simply paid providers. However, there
is evidence that members of RSBY are not treated well
by service providers, which suggests that the schemes
are not playing an active role in clarifying their expecta-
tions of providers or monitoring service quality and taking
remedial action where service provision is not acceptable.
Even though capacity may exist within schemes in India, it
appears to be relatively weak and there is a lack of capacity
in the state nodal agencies, which supervise the insurance
companies, as there are similar difficulties to that in
Malawi in terms of timely payment of providers. Very little
is known about how the health maintenance organisations
that purchase services on behalf of NHIS members in
Nigeria function, but it appears that there is limited effort
to ensure that members receive the services and medicines
that they need.
One of the key factors in Thailand’s success is the cap-
acity of the National Health Security Office (NHSO) and
its strong and stable administration, which has been
maintained through many changes in government [11].
NHSO is a public, autonomous body created to manage
UCS and purchase health services. Although the NHSO
is not a monopsony purchaser, as there are two othermandatory schemes operating in Thailand, it covers 75% of
the population. The NHSO has used its purchasing power
effectively to negotiate lower prices for key services (such
as haemodialysis), medicines and medical devices.
Policy related issues
Some of the country case studies undertook a policy ana-
lysis, but all pointed to some health financing policy con-
text, process or actors’ issues. One of the clearest policy
messages from the case studies is the importance of key
windows of opportunity, such as those offered during
election campaigns (which was important in introducing
the UCS in Thailand and in the NHI in Ghana [19]), and
the critical role of political leadership at the highest pos-
sible level. For example, President Calderon established
the CCSS in Costa Rica in the 1940s and President
Figueres played a critical role in ensuring that later reforms
were not derailed by disagreements between opposing ac-
tors [10]. Similarly, Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra
championed the introduction of the UCS in Thailand [11].
In contrast, in Nigeria, the lack of high-level political sup-
port, particularly from the governors in most states, has
been an impediment to the NHIS being expanded from
civil servants at the federal level to those at state level [6].
The Nigerian experience also highlights the importance of
the political administration context; the high level of de-
centralisation of decision-making to state level has im-
peded implementation of the NHIS, which was initiated by
the federal government.
Citizens have also been critical in sustaining UHC fi-
nancing reforms. Both Thailand and Ghana have experi-
enced multiple changes in government, including to
governments run by the political party that was in oppos-
ition when specific reforms were introduced, yet the re-
forms have remained on track. This has largely been due
to high levels of support from citizens. The Thai experi-
ence demonstrates that citizen action has also been im-
portant in extending the service benefit entitlements of
the UCS. While this can create a problem for affordability
of a UHC system (for example, if the public is constantly
calling for the latest technology to be adopted), this was
addressed in Thailand through careful use of technology
assessment to ensure the most cost-effective interven-
tions are adopted [11]. Public support has also been crit-
ical in sustaining the CCSS system in Costa Rica [10]. It
is particularly interesting that the mobilisation of citizens
around health issues is most evident in countries such as
Costa Rica, Thailand and Ghana where there is an expli-
cit policy commitment to universality from the outset of
the health financing reforms.
A number of the country case studies highlighted im-
portant issues in relation to policy processes, particularly
implementation processes. The need for careful prep-
aration for policy implementation was highlighted in
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put in place, hindering implementation. In Malawi, the
policy was implemented in haste, without developing the
required capacity at district level to manage the contracts
or establishing mechanisms for monitoring and evalu-
ation and for resolving contractual problems. The im-
portance of communication about the policy to managers
and front-line health workers, as well as the general pub-
lic, to promote successful implementation is also illus-
trated in several of the case studies. In Tanzania, there
was little awareness of the reforms at district and facility
level, including among those involved in the CHF whose
management structures were being changed, which again
impeded implementation [7]. In India, there was little
public communication resulting in very poor knowledge
of entitlements amongst RSBY beneficiaries (many did
not know that the card could be used for inpatient care,
or did not know that they had to use specific hospitals
that had been empaneled by their insurance scheme,
etc.). This contributed to more than half of beneficiaries
in the study area still making substantial out-of-pocket
payments for inpatient care [5].
Paying careful attention to implementation processes,
as well as active monitoring and evaluation of implementa-
tion practice can make the difference between simply cre-
ating entitlements to needed health services and financial
protection and intended beneficiaries being able to realise
these entitlements.
Key issues for future research
The findings from the seven country case studies high-
light a number of areas for future research in health care
financing and progress towards UHC.
Firstly, the results from the seven country case studies
pose a number of important questions on revenue col-
lection and pooling that require careful consideration
and further examination, including:
 To what extent should contributory schemes (as
opposed to using government revenue) be pursued
in order to cover those outside the formal sector in
low- and middle-income countries?
 What is the appropriate use of limited government
resources, particularly relating to the prioritisation
of government funds to pay for health insurance
contributions for those who are relatively better off,
such as civil servants?
 To what extent should a targeting approach in
health care financing, which involves the use of
means testing or proxy indicators to determine
eligibility for social benefits, be pursued instead
of a universalist approach, which considers the
entire population to be the beneficiary of social
benefits? What is the relative importance in UHC policies of
pooling general tax funds with mandatory insurance
contributions to create a single pool to maximise
income and risk cross-subsidies?
There are three specific issues in the area of pur-
chasing where further research is warranted. Firstly, the
country case studies highlighted problems associated with
limited benefit packages, particularly where some popula-
tion groups have access to more comprehensive services.
This highlights the need for more examination of the
balance between cost, population and service coverage in
progressing to UHC. Secondly, several countries intro-
duced capitation and DRG payment mechanisms instead
of fee-for-service, with varying degrees of success. Further
examination of the factors influencing effective implemen-
tation of these provider payment mechanisms is required.
Thirdly, as little is known about how best to achieve stra-
tegic purchasing, there is a need to further investigate the
structure of the organisations and institutional arrange-
ments that may facilitate strategic purchasing to ensure
quality care provision and efficient use of resources by pro-
viders. This should include the relative effectiveness of au-
tonomous public institutions (for example in Costa Rica
and Thailand) compared with private insurance companies
(such as in Georgia and some schemes in India) in under-
taking strategic purchasing functions using public funds.
The findings from the seven country case studies also
emphasise the importance of paying careful attention to
the details of the policy process, during both the formu-
lation and the implementation processes, in order for
the health care financing policy to realise its intended out-
comes. Many of the country studies used mixed methods
and employed a case study approach to better understand
how health care financing policies were implemented and
to identify underlying factors that influenced the outcome
of the policies. There is a great need for further research
using a robust case study approach to provide rich infor-
mation on how different health care financing policies have
been implemented, what factors have contributed to
achieving particular outcomes and in what contexts, and
how to manage the process of health care financing policy
implementation in order to achieve policy objectives and
contribute to progressing towards UHC.Abbreviations
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